Banas, J.A. and Miller, G. |
Inducing resistance to conspiracy theory propaganda: Testing inoculation and metainoculation strategies [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2013 |
Human Communication Research |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: This investigation examined the boundaries of inoculation theory by examining how inoculation can be applied to conspiracy theory propaganda as well as inoculation itself (called metainoculation). A 3-phase experiment with 312 participants compared 3 main groups: no-treatment control, inoculation, and metainoculation. Research questions exploredhowinoculation andmetainoculation effects differ based on the argument structure of inoculationmessages (fact- vs. logic-based). The attack message was a 40-minute chapter from the 9/11 Truth conspiracy theory film, LooseChange: Final Cut.The results indicated that both the inoculation treatments induced more resistance than the control message, with the fact-based treatment being the most effective. The results also revealed that metainoculation treatments reduced the efficacy of the inoculation treatment |
BibTeX:
@article{Banas2013,
author = {Banas, John A. and Miller, Gregory},
title = {Inducing resistance to conspiracy theory propaganda: Testing inoculation and metainoculation strategies},
journal = {Human Communication Research},
year = {2013},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/hcre.12000}
}
|
Brotherton, R., French, C.C. and Pickering, A.D. |
Measuring belief in conspiracy theories: The generic conspiracist beliefs scale [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2013 |
Frontiers in Psychology |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: The psychology of conspiracy theory beliefs is not yet well understood, although research indicates that there are stable individual differences in conspiracist ideation - individuals' general tendency to engage with conspiracy theories. Researchers have created several short self-report measures of conspiracist ideation. These measures largely consist of items referring to an assortment of prominent conspiracy theories regarding specific real-world events. However, these instruments have not been psychometrically validated, and this assessment approach suffers from practical and theoretical limitations. Therefore, we present the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs (GCB) scale: a novel measure of individual differences in generic conspiracist ideation. The scale was developed and validated across four studies. In Study 1, exploratory factor analysis of a novel 75-item measure of non-event-based conspiracist beliefs identified five conspiracist facets. The 15-item GCB scale was developed to sample from each of these themes. Studies 2, 3, and 4 examined the structure and validity of the GCB, demonstrating internal reliability, content, criterion-related, convergent and discriminant validity, and good test-retest reliability. In sum, this research indicates that the GCB is a psychometrically sound and practically useful measure of conspiracist ideation, and the findings add to our theoretical understanding of conspiracist ideation as a monological belief system unpinned by a relatively small number of generic assumptions about the typicality of conspiratorial activity in the world. |
BibTeX:
@article{Brotherton2013,
author = {Brotherton, Robert and French, Christopher C. and Pickering, Alan D.},
title = {Measuring belief in conspiracy theories: The generic conspiracist beliefs scale},
journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
year = {2013},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00279}
}
|
Butt, L. |
"Lipstick Girls" and "Fallen Women": AIDS and Conspiratorial Thinking in Papua, Indonesia [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2005 |
Cultural Anthropology |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: A widespread theory in the province of Papua, Eastern Indonesia, links the spread of sex workers and HIV/AIDS to a broader government conspiracy to eliminate indigenous Papuans. Explicit conspiratorial thinking by indigenous Papuans draws from diverse evidence such as provincial partition legislation, patterns of sex-industry usage, economic transformations, rumors of witchcraft, and new automobile technology. This article argues against treating conspiracy theories about AIDS simply as symbolically powerful rumors expressing indigenous Papuans' perceptions of oppression and unequal access to state resources. Rather, conspiracy theories articulate awareness of inconsistencies in the government's formulation and administration of sexual regulations and AIDS-prevention policies. AIDS conspiracy theories can therefore be understood as pragmatic and detailed interpretations of Papuan lived experiences in a context of ethnically disenfranchising forms of power in post-Suharto Indonesia. |
BibTeX:
@article{Butt2005,
author = {Butt, Leslie},
title = {"Lipstick Girls" and "Fallen Women": AIDS and Conspiratorial Thinking in Papua, Indonesia},
journal = {Cultural Anthropology},
year = {2005},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1525/can.2005.20.3.412}
}
|
Dagnall, N., Drinkwater, K., Parker, A., Denovan, A. and Parton, M. |
Conspiracy theory and cognitive style: A worldview [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2015 |
Frontiers in Psychology |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: This paper assessed whether belief in conspiracy theories was associated with a particularly cognitive style (worldview). The sample comprised 223 volunteers recruited via convenience sampling and included undergraduates, postgraduates, university employees, and alumni. Respondents completed measures assessing a range of cognitive-perceptual factors (schizotypy, delusional ideation, and hallucination proneness) and conspiratorial beliefs (general attitudes toward conspiracist thinking and endorsement of individual conspiracies). Positive symptoms of schizotypy, particularly the cognitive-perceptual factor, correlated positively with conspiracist beliefs. The best predictor of belief in conspiracies was delusional ideation. Consistent with the notion of a coherent conspiratorial mindset, scores across conspiracy measures correlated strongly. Whilst findings supported the view that belief in conspiracies, within the sub-clinical population, was associated with a delusional thinking style, cognitive-perceptual factors in combination accounted for only 32% of the variance. |
BibTeX:
@article{Dagnall2015,
author = {Dagnall, Neil and Drinkwater, Kenneth and Parker, Andrew and Denovan, Andrew and Parton, Megan},
title = {Conspiracy theory and cognitive style: A worldview},
journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
year = {2015},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00206}
}
|
Darwin, H., Neave, N. and Holmes, J. |
Belief in conspiracy theories. The role of paranormal belief, paranoid ideation and schizotypy [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2011 |
Personality and Individual Differences |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: Surveys indicate that belief in conspiracy theories is widespread. Previous studies have indicated that such beliefs are related to agreeableness, low levels of self esteem, certain negative attitudes towards authority, and paranoia. The current study investigated the relationship between conspiracy theory beliefs, paranormal belief, paranoid ideation, and schizotypy, in a study involving 60 females and 60 males aged 18-50. Sex differences were found in paranormal belief, with females scoring significantly higher than males in spiritualism, precognition, psi, and overall paranormal belief. Partial correlations controlling for sex showed that conspiracy beliefs were significantly and positively correlated with paranormal beliefs, paranoid ideation and schizotypy. Confirmatory analysis revealed a best fit model to explain conspiracy beliefs that included schizotypy and paranoid ideation, but not paranormal beliefs. These findings suggest that paranoid ideation and schizotypy are strongly associated with belief in conspiracy theories. textcopyright 2011 Elsevier Ltd. |
BibTeX:
@article{Darwin2011,
author = {Darwin, Hannah and Neave, Nick and Holmes, Joni},
title = {Belief in conspiracy theories. The role of paranormal belief, paranoid ideation and schizotypy},
journal = {Personality and Individual Differences},
year = {2011},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.02.027}
}
|
Elman, J.L. |
Origins of language: A conspiracy theory [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
1999 |
The emergence of language |
article |
|
Abstract: The paper presents a very interesting account of ways to be innate. In particular, the author addresses the question of chronotopic innateness, showing that children are not necessarily equiped with a UG or similar device, but are aided in their language acquisition process by the restrictions on the perception and memory capacities. |
BibTeX:
@article{Elman1999,
author = {Elman, Jeffrey L.},
title = {Origins of language: A conspiracy theory},
journal = {The emergence of language},
year = {1999}
}
|
Fekete, L. |
The muslim conspiracy theory and the oslo massacre [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2012 |
Race and Class |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: Anders Behring Breivik, perpetrator of the Norwegian massacre, was motivated by a belief in a Muslim conspiracy to take over Europe. Extreme and aberrant his actions were, but, explains the author, elements of this conspiracy theory are held and circulated in Europe today across a broad political spectrum, with internet-focused counter-jihadist activists at one end and neoconservative and cultural conservative columnists, commentators and politicians at the other. The political fallout from the circulation of these ideas ranges from test cases over free speech in the courts to agitation on the ground from defence leagues, anti-minaret campaigners and stop Islamisation groups. Although the conspiracy draws on older forms of racism, it also incorporates new frameworks: the clash of civilisations, Islamofascism, the new anti-Semitism and Eurabia. This Muslim conspiracy bears many of the hallmarks of the 'Jewish conspiracy theory', yet, ironically, its adherents, some of whom were formerly linked to anti-Semitic traditions, have now, because of their fear of Islam and Arab countries, become staunch defenders of Israel and Zionism. Reprinted by permission of the Institute of Race Relations |
BibTeX:
@article{Fekete2012,
author = {Fekete, Liz},
title = {The muslim conspiracy theory and the oslo massacre},
journal = {Race and Class},
year = {2012},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396811425984}
}
|
Geertz, C. |
Thick Discription: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2003 |
Readings in the philosophy of social science |
incollection |
DOI |
Abstract: From: http://anthropology.ua.edu/cultures/cultures.php?culture=Symbolic%20and%20Interpretive%20Anthropologies Thick Description is a term Geertz borrowed from Gilbert Ryle to describe and define the aim of interpretive anthropology. He argues that social Anthropology is based on ethnography, or the study of culture. Culture is based on the symbols that guide community behavior. Symbols obtain meaning from the role which they play in the patterned behavior of social life. Culture and behavior cannot be studied separately because they are intertwined. By analyzing the whole of culture as well as its constituent parts, one develops a "thick description" which details the mental processes and reasoning of the natives Thick description, however, is an interpretation of what the natives are thinking made by an outsider who cannot think like a nativebut is made possible by anthropological theory (Geertz 1973d; see also Tongs 1993). To illustrate thick description, Geertz uses Ryle's example which discusses the difference between a "blink" and a "wink." One, a blink, is an involuntary twitch --the thin description-- and the other, a wink, is a conspiratorial signal to a friend--the thick description. While the physical movements involved in each are identical, each has a distinct meaning "as anyone unfortunate enough to have had the first taken for the second knows" (Geertz 1973d:6). A wink is a special form of communication which consists of several characteristics: it is deliberate; to someone in particular; to impart a particular message; according to a socially established code; and without the knowledge of the other members of the group of which the winker and winkee are a part. In addition, the wink can be a parody of someone else's wink or an attempt to lead others to believe that a conspiracy of sorts is occuring. Each type of wink can be considered to be a separate cultural category (Geertz 1973d:6-7). The combination of the blink and the types of winks discussed above (and those that lie between them) produce "a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures" (Geertz 1973d:7) in which winks and twitches are produced and interpreted. This, Geertz argues, is the object of ethnography: to decipher this hierarchy of cultural categories. The thick description, therefore, is a description of the particular form of communication used, like a parody of someone else's wink or a backslashconspiratorial wink. |
BibTeX:
@incollection{Geertz2003,
author = {Geertz, C},
title = {Thick Discription: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture},
booktitle = {Readings in the philosophy of social science},
year = {2003},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004}
}
|
Heins, V. |
Critical theory and the traps of conspiracy thinking [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2007 |
Philosophy & Social Criticism |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: Historically, blatantly untrue and defamatory conspiracy theories had disastrous consequences for those who were portrayed in them as evil-doers. At the same time, conspiratorial agreements at the expense of the common good between powerful groups in society do exist and have occasionally been uncovered. Against this background, the article describes different ways in which critical theory has looked at conspiracies. First, an attempt is made to show that Max Horkheimer's notes on `rackets' are an ambitious but flawed attempt to theorize conspiracy. It is argued that Horkheimer's theory is imbued by the very conspiracy thinking that he proposed to criticize. Second, the author suggests recovering Franz Neumann's concept of `political alienation' as a more appropriate starting point to think critically about the ethical and epistemological questions raised by conspiracy theories. |
BibTeX:
@article{Heins2007,
author = {Heins, Volker},
title = {Critical theory and the traps of conspiracy thinking},
journal = {Philosophy & Social Criticism},
year = {2007},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453707081675}
}
|
Imhoff, R. and Lamberty, P.K. |
Too special to be duped: Need for uniqueness motivates conspiracy beliefs [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2017 |
European Journal of Social Psychology |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: Copyright textcopyright 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Adding to the growing literature on the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs, this paper argues that a small part in motivating the endorsement of such seemingly irrational beliefs is the desire to stick out from the crowd, the need for uniqueness. Across three studies, we establish a modest but robust association between the self-attributed need for uniqueness and a general conspirational mindset (conspiracy mentality) as well as the endorsement of specific conspiracy beliefs. Following up on previous findings that people high in need for uniqueness resist majority and yield to minority influence, Study 3 experimentally shows that a fictitious conspiracy theory received more support by people high in conspiracy mentality when this theory was said to be supported by only a minority (vs. majority) of survey respondents. Together, these findings support the notion that conspiracy beliefs can be adopted as a means to attain a sense of uniqueness. |
BibTeX:
@article{Imhoff2017,
author = {Imhoff, Roland and Lamberty, Pia Karoline},
title = {Too special to be duped: Need for uniqueness motivates conspiracy beliefs},
journal = {European Journal of Social Psychology},
year = {2017},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2265}
}
|
Miller, J.M., Saunders, K.L. and Farhart, C.E. |
Conspiracy Endorsement as Motivated Reasoning: The Moderating Roles of Political Knowledge and Trust [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2016 |
American Journal of Political Science |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: Given the potential political and social significance of conspiracy beliefs, a substantial and growing body of work examines the individual-level correlates of belief in conspiracy theories and general conspiratorial predispositions. However, although we know much about the psychological antecedents of conspiracy endorsement, we know less about the individual-level political causes of these prevalent and consequential beliefs. Our work draws from the extant literature to posit that endorsement of conspiracy theories is a motivated process that serves both ideological and psychological needs. In doing so,we develop a theory that identifies a particular type of person—onewho is both highly knowledgeable about politics and lacking in trust—who ismost susceptible to ideologicallymotivated conspiracy endorsement. Further, we demonstrate that the moderators of belief in conspiracy theories are strikingly different for conservatives and liberals. |
BibTeX:
@article{Miller2016,
author = {Miller, Joanne M. and Saunders, Kyle L. and Farhart, Christina E.},
title = {Conspiracy Endorsement as Motivated Reasoning: The Moderating Roles of Political Knowledge and Trust},
journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
year = {2016},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12234}
}
|
Motter, G. |
Conspiracy theory [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2009 |
EDN |
article |
|
Abstract: Over one-quarter of all federal criminal prosecutions and a large number of state cases involve prosecutions for conspiracy. Yet, the major scholarly articles and the bulk of prominent jurists have roundly condemned the doctrine. This Article offers a functional justification for the legal prohibition against conspiracy, centering on psychological and economic accounts. Advances in psychology over the past thirty years have demonstrated that groups cultivate a special social identity. This identity often encourages risky behavior, leads individuals to behave against their self-interest, solidifies loyalty, and facilitates harm against non-members. So, too, economists have developed sophisticated explanations for why firms promote efficiency, leading to new theories in corporate law. These insights can be "reverse-engineered" to make conspiracies operate less efficiently. In reverse-engineering corporate-law principles and introducing lessons from psychology, a rich account of how government should approach conspiracy begins to unfold. In particular, law enforcement strives to prevent conspiracies from forming by imposing high up-front penalties for joiners but uses mechanisms to harvest information from those who have joined and decide to cooperate with the government. Traditional conspiracy doctrines such as Pinkerton liability and the exclusion from merger not only further cooperation agreements, they also make conspiracies more difficult to create and maintain by forcing them to adopt bundles of inefficient practices. The possibility of defection forces the syndicate to use expensive monitoring of its employees for evidence of possible collusion with the government. Mechanisms for defection also break down trust within the group and prime members to think that others are acting out of self-interest. The Article concludes by offering a variety of refinements to conspiracy law that will help destabilize trust within the conspiracy, cue the defection of conspirators, and permit law enforcement to extract more information from them. |
BibTeX:
@article{Motter2009,
author = {Motter, Garry},
title = {Conspiracy theory},
journal = {EDN},
year = {2009}
}
|
Newheiser, A.K., Farias, M. and Tausch, N. |
The functional nature of conspiracy beliefs: Examining the underpinnings of belief in the Da Vinci Code conspiracy [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2011 |
Personality and Individual Differences |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: Focusing on a contemporary conspiracy theory popularized in the novel The Da Vinci Code (Brown, 2002), we examined the underlying psychological factors and individual differences that may predict belief in conspiracy theories, and assessed such beliefs' resistance to counterevidence. Our results suggest that belief in the Da Vinci Code conspiracy may be associated with coping with existential threat and death-related anxiety. In addition, the extent to which participants believed in the conspiracy was associated with the endorsement of congruent (New Age spiritual) and competing (Christian religious) beliefs, in opposite directions. Finally, exposure to counterevidence resulted in belief reduction, specifically among more religious participants (i.e. among those endorsing a competing belief system). We suggest that belief in modern conspiracy theories may help individuals attain or maintain a sense of meaning, control, and security. textcopyright 2011 Elsevier Ltd. |
BibTeX:
@article{Newheiser2011,
author = {Newheiser, Anna Kaisa and Farias, Miguel and Tausch, Nicole},
title = {The functional nature of conspiracy beliefs: Examining the underpinnings of belief in the Da Vinci Code conspiracy},
journal = {Personality and Individual Differences},
year = {2011},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.08.011}
}
|
Oliver, J.E. and Wood, T.J. |
Conspiracy theories and the paranoid style(s) of mass opinion [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2014 |
American Journal of Political Science |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: textcopyright2014, Midwest Political Science Association.Although conspiracy theories have long been a staple of American political culture, no research has systematically examined the nature of their support in the mass public. Using four nationally representative surveys, sampled between 2006 and 2011, we find that half of the American public consistently endorses at least one conspiracy theory and that many popular conspiracy theories are differentiated along ideological and anomic dimensions. In contrast with many theoretical speculations, we do not find conspiracism to be a product of greater authoritarianism, ignorance, or political conservatism. Rather, the likelihood of supporting conspiracy theories is strongly predicted by a willingness to believe in other unseen, intentional forces and an attraction to Manichean narratives. These findings both demonstrate the widespread allure of conspiracy theories as political explanations and offer new perspectives on the forces that shape mass opinion and American political culture. |
BibTeX:
@article{Oliver2014,
author = {Oliver, J. Eric and Wood, Thomas J.},
title = {Conspiracy theories and the paranoid style(s) of mass opinion},
journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
year = {2014},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12084}
}
|
Phillipson, R. |
Linguistic imperialism: a conspiracy, or a conspiracy of silence? [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2007 |
Language Policy |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: This is a response to Bernard Spolsky's coverage of ‘how English spread' in his book on language policy (2004) and his assertion that my book on linguistic imperialism (1992) subscribes to a conspiracy theory. |
BibTeX:
@article{Phillipson2007,
author = {Phillipson, Robert},
title = {Linguistic imperialism: a conspiracy, or a conspiracy of silence?},
journal = {Language Policy},
year = {2007},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10993-007-9058-3}
}
|
Raab, M.H., Ortlieb, S.A., Auer, N., Guthmann, K. and Carbon, C.C. |
Thirty shades of truth: Conspiracy theories as stories of individuation, not of pathological delusion [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2013 |
Frontiers in Psychology |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: Recent studies on conspiracy theories employ standardized questionnaires, thus neglecting their narrative qualities by reducing them to mere statements. Recipients are considered as consumers only. Two empirical studies-a conventional survey (n = 63) and a study using the method of narrative construction (n = 30)-which were recently conducted by the authors of this paper-suggest that the truth about conspiracy theories is more complex. Given a set of statements about a dramatic historic event (in our case 9/11) that includes official testimonies, allegations to a conspiracy and extremely conspiratorial statements, the majority of participants created a narrative of 9/11 they deemed plausible that might be considered a conspiracy theory. The resulting 30 idiosyncratic stories imply that no clear distinction between official story and conspiratorial narrative is possible any more when the common approach of questionnaires is abandoned. Based on these findings, we present a new theoretical and methodological approach which acknowledges conspiracy theories as a means of constructing and communicating a set of personal values. While broadening the view upon such theories, we stay compatible with other approaches that have focused on extreme theory types. In our view, accepting conspiracy theories as a common, regulative and possibly benign phenomenon, we will be better able to understand why some people cling to immunized, racist and off-wall stories-and others do not. textcopyright 2013 Raab, Ortlieb, Auer, Guthmann and Carbon. |
BibTeX:
@article{Raab2013,
author = {Raab, Marius H. and Ortlieb, Stefan A. and Auer, Nikolas and Guthmann, Klara and Carbon, Claus Christian},
title = {Thirty shades of truth: Conspiracy theories as stories of individuation, not of pathological delusion},
journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
year = {2013},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00406}
}
|
Stempel, C., Hargrove, T. and Stempel, G.H. |
Media use, social structure, and belief in 9/11 conspiracy theories [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2007 |
Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: A survey of 1,010 randomly selected adults asked about media use and belief in three conspiracy theories about the attacks of September 11, 2001. "Paranoid style" and "cultural sociology" theories are outlined, and empirical support is found for both. Patterns vary somewhat by conspiracy theory, but members of less powerful groups (racial minorities, lower social class, women, younger ages) are more likely to believe at least one of the conspiracies, as are those with low levels of media involvement and consumers of less legitimate media (blogs and grocery store tabloids). Consumers of legitimate media (daily newspapers and network TV news) are less likely to believe at least one of the conspiracies, although these relationships are not significant after controlling for social structural variables. Beliefs in all three conspiracies are aligned with mainstream political party divisions, evidence that conspiracy thinking is now a normal part of mainstream political conflict in the United States. PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] |
BibTeX:
@article{Stempel2007,
author = {Stempel, Carl and Hargrove, Thomas and Stempel, Guido H.},
title = {Media use, social structure, and belief in 9/11 conspiracy theories},
journal = {Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly},
year = {2007},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/107769900708400210}
}
|
Swami, V., Coles, R., Stieger, S., Pietschnig, J., Furnham, A., Rehim, S. and Voracek, M. |
Conspiracist ideation in Britain and Austria: Evidence of a monological belief system and associations between individual psychological differences and real-world and fictitious conspiracy theories [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2011 |
British Journal of Psychology |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: Despite evidence of widespread belief in conspiracy theories, there remains a dearth of research on the individual difference correlates of conspiracist ideation. In two studies, we sought to overcome this limitation by examining correlations between conspiracist ideation and a range of individual psychological factors. In Study 1, 817 Britons indicated their agreement with conspiracist ideation concerning the July 7, 2005 (7/7), London bombings, and completed a battery of individual difference scales. Results showed that stronger belief in 7/7 conspiracy theories was predicted by stronger belief in other real-world conspiracy theories, greater exposure to conspiracist ideation, higher political cynicism, greater support for democratic principles, more negative attitudes to authority, lower self-esteem, and lower Agreeableness. In Study 2, 281 Austrians indicated their agreement with an entirely fictitious conspiracy theory and completed a battery of individual difference measures not examined in Study 1. Results showed that belief in the entirely fictitious conspiracy theory was significantly associated with stronger belief in other real-world conspiracy theories, stronger paranormal beliefs, and lower crystallized intelligence. These results are discussed in terms of the potential of identifying individual difference constellations among conspiracy theorists. |
BibTeX:
@article{Swami2011,
author = {Swami, Viren and Coles, Rebecca and Stieger, Stefan and Pietschnig, Jakob and Furnham, Adrian and Rehim, Sherry and Voracek, Martin},
title = {Conspiracist ideation in Britain and Austria: Evidence of a monological belief system and associations between individual psychological differences and real-world and fictitious conspiracy theories},
journal = {British Journal of Psychology},
year = {2011},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8295.2010.02004.x}
}
|
Swami, V. |
Social psychological origins of conspiracy theories: The case of the Jewish conspiracy theory in Malaysia [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2012 |
Frontiers in Psychology |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: Two studies examined correlates of belief in a Jewish conspiracy theory among Malays in Malaysia, a culture in which state-directed conspiracism as a means of dealing with perceived external and internal threats is widespread. In Study 1, 368 participants from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, completed a novel measure of belief in a Jewish conspiracy theory, along with measures of general conspiracist ideation, and anomie. Initial analysis showed that the novel scale factorially reduced to a single dimension. Further analysis showed that belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory was only significantly associated with general conspiracist ideation, but the strength of the association was weak. In Study 2, 314 participants completed the measure of belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory, along with measures of general conspiracist ideation, and ideological attitudes. Results showed that belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory was associated with anti-Israeli attitudes, modern racism directed at the Chinese, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation. General conspiracist ideation did not emerge as a significant predictor once other variables had been accounted for. These results suggest that there may be specific cultural and social psychological forces that drive belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory within the Malaysian context. Specifically, belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory among Malaysian Malays appears to serve ideological needs and as a mask for anti-Chinese sentiment, which may in turn reaffirm their perceived ability to shape socio-political processes. |
BibTeX:
@article{Swami2012,
author = {Swami, Viren},
title = {Social psychological origins of conspiracy theories: The case of the Jewish conspiracy theory in Malaysia},
journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
year = {2012},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00280}
}
|
Uscinski, J.E., Klofstad, C. and Atkinson, M.D. |
What Drives Conspiratorial Beliefs? The Role of Informational Cues and Predispositions [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2016 |
Political Research Quarterly |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: Why do people believe in conspiracy theories? This study breaks from much previous research and attempts to explain conspiratorial beliefs with traditional theories of opinion formation. Specifically, we focus on the reception of informational cues given a set of predispositions (political and conspiratorial). We begin with observational survey data to show that there exists a unique predisposition that drives individuals to one degree or another to believe in conspiracy theories. This predisposition appears orthogonal to partisanship and predicts political behaviors including voter participation. Then a national survey experiment is used to test the effect of an informational cue on belief in a conspiracy theory while accounting for both conspiratorial predispositions and partisanship. Our results provide an explanation for individual-level heterogeneity in the holding of conspiratorial beliefs and also indicate the conditions under which information can drive conspiratorial beliefs. |
BibTeX:
@article{Uscinski2016,
author = {Uscinski, Joseph E. and Klofstad, Casey and Atkinson, Matthew D.},
title = {What Drives Conspiratorial Beliefs? The Role of Informational Cues and Predispositions},
journal = {Political Research Quarterly},
year = {2016},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912915621621}
}
|
Van der Linden, S. |
The conspiracy-effect: Exposure to conspiracy theories (about global warming) decreases pro-social behavior and science acceptance [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2015 |
Personality and Individual Differences |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: Although public endorsement of conspiracy theories is growing, the potentially negative societal consequences of widespread conspiracy ideation remain unclear. While past studies have mainly examined the personality correlates of conspiracy ideation, this study examines the conspiracy-effect; the extent to which exposure to an actual conspiracy theory influences pro-social and environmental decision-making. Participants (N=316) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions; (a) a brief conspiracy video about global warming, (b) an inspirational pro-climate video or (c) a control group. Results indicate that those participants who were exposed to the conspiracy video were significantly less likely to think that there is widespread scientific agreement on human-caused climate change, less likely to sign a petition to help reduce global warming and less likely to donate or volunteer for a charity in the next six months. These results strongly point to the socio-cognitive potency of conspiracies and highlight that exposure to popular conspiracy theories can have negative and undesirable societal consequences. |
BibTeX:
@article{VanderLinden2015,
author = {Van der Linden, Sander},
title = {The conspiracy-effect: Exposure to conspiracy theories (about global warming) decreases pro-social behavior and science acceptance},
journal = {Personality and Individual Differences},
year = {2015},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2015.07.045}
}
|
Wood, M.J. and Douglas, K.M. |
What about building 7?" A social psychological study of online discussion of 9/11 conspiracy theories [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2013 |
Frontiers in Psychology |
article |
DOI |
Abstract: Recent research into the psychology of conspiracy belief has highlighted the importance of belief systems in the acceptance or rejection of conspiracy theories. We examined a large sample of conspiracist (pro-conspiracy-theory) and conventionalist (anti-conspiracy-theory) comments on news websites in order to investigate the relative importance of promoting alternative explanations vs. rejecting conventional explanations for events. In accordance with our hypotheses, we found that conspiracist commenters were more likely to argue against the opposing interpretation and less likely to argue in favor of their own interpretation, while the opposite was true of conventionalist commenters. However, conspiracist comments were more likely to explicitly put forward an account than conventionalist comments were. In addition, conspiracists were more likely to express mistrust and made more positive and fewer negative references to other conspiracy theories. The data also indicate that conspiracists were largely unwilling to apply the "conspiracy theory" label to their own beliefs and objected when others did so, lending support to the long-held suggestion that conspiracy belief carries a social stigma. Finally, conventionalist arguments tended to have a more hostile tone. These tendencies in persuasive communication can be understood as a reflection of an underlying conspiracist worldview in which the details of individual conspiracy theories are less important than a generalized rejection of official explanations. |
BibTeX:
@article{Wood2013,
author = {Wood, Michael J. and Douglas, Karen M.},
title = {What about building 7?" A social psychological study of online discussion of 9/11 conspiracy theories},
journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
year = {2013},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00409}
}
|
Xu, Z., Pothula, S.P., Wilson, J.S. and Apte, M.V. |
Pancreatic cancer and its stroma: A conspiracy theory [Abstract] [BibTeX] |
2014 |
World Journal of Gastroenterology |
misc |
DOI |
Abstract: textcopyright 2014 Baishideng Publishing Group Inc. All rights reserved. Pancreatic cancer is characterised by a prominent desmoplastic/stromal reaction that has received little attention until recent times. Given that treatments focusing on pancreatic cancer cells alone have failed to significantly improve patient outcome over many decades, research efforts have now moved to understanding the pathophysiology of the stromal reaction and its role in cancer progression. In this regard, our Group was the first to identify the cells (pancreatic stellate cells, PSCs) that produced the collagenous stroma of pancreatic cancer and to demonstrate that these cells interacted closely with cancer cells to facilitate local tumour growth and distant metastasis. Evidence is accumulating to indicate that stromal PSCs may also mediate angiogenesis, immune evasion and the well known resistance of pancreatic cancer to chemotherapy and radiotherapy. This review will summarise current knowledge regarding the critical role of pancreatic stellate cells and the stroma in pancreatic cancer biology and the therapeutic approaches being developed to target the stroma in a bid to improve the outcome of this devastating disease. |
BibTeX:
@misc{Xu2014,
author = {Xu, Zhihong and Pothula, Srinivasa P. and Wilson, Jeremy S. and Apte, Minoti V.},
title = {Pancreatic cancer and its stroma: A conspiracy theory},
booktitle = {World Journal of Gastroenterology},
year = {2014},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.3748/wjg.v20.i32.11216}
}
|